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CObjective: We analyzed the effects of the timing of vaccine distribu-
tion in 11 US states during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Meth-
ds: By using reported data on the fraction of patients presenting with
u-related symptoms, we developed a transformation that allowed es-
imation of the state-specific temporal fluwave curve, representing the
umber of new infections during each week. We also utilized data
escribing the weekly numbers of vaccine doses delivered and admin-
stered. By using a simple difference equations model of flu progres-
ion, we developed two influenza wave curves: first, an “observable”
urve that included the beneficial effects of vaccinations, and second,
n unobservable curve that depicted how the flu would have pro-
ressed with no vaccine administered. We fit the observable curve to
atch the estimated epidemic curve and early exponential growth as-
ociated with R , the reproductive number. By comparing the number
of infections in each scenario, we estimated the infections averted by O
o rep
ering
A 02
al So
doi:10.1016/j.jval.2011.07.014the administration of vaccine. Results: Southern states experienced
peak infection several weeks before northern states, and most of the
vaccine was delivered well after the peak of the southern flu wave. Our
models suggest that the vaccine had minimal ameliorative impact in
the southern states and measurable positive impact in the northern
states. Vaccine delivery after peak also results in a smaller fraction of
the population’s seeking the vaccine. Conclusions: Our analysis sug-
ests that current Centers for Disease Control and Prevention policy of
llocating flu vaccine over time in direct proportion to states’ popula-
ions may not be best in terms of averting nationally the maximum
ossible number of infections.
eywords: H1N1, influenza, pandemic reaction, vaccine availability,
accine distribution.
opyright © 2012, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and0
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
The novel H1N1 influenza virus surfaced in San Diego in early
April 2009 and very soon thereafter in Mexico and was announced
as a pandemic by theWorld Health Organization in June 2009 [1,2].
By early fall, most of the world was experiencing the wave of the
H1N1 pandemic [3]. The US Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) took the threat of a pandemic seriously, and by the
middle of April 2009, researchers began to develop vaccines
matched to the new virus [1]. The vaccine production process for a
novel flu strain requires at least 6 months for virus identification,
vaccine invention, and then mass production using a long-stand-
ing egg-based technology. The inherent delays resulted in the first
vaccines’ being shipped in early October 2009 [4]. The vaccine had
varying ameliorative effects in different regions of the United
States. Partly because of early school openings in the southeast [5],
the major wave of the outbreak hit the southeastern states earlier
than the northern ones. Nonetheless, vaccines as produced were
delivered to states strictly on a per capita basis [4], with each state
receiving vaccine in direct proportion to its population. As a result,
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1098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2012, Internation
Published by Elsevier Inc.some states were able to vaccinate a significant portion of their
population prior to the major flu wave’s hitting, while others did
not receive vaccines until the major flu wave had already passed
and interest in vaccinations had waned. Vaccine distribution
within individual states was significantly more complicated be-
cause states had relative freedom in utilizing the vaccines shipped
from the CDC. We refer the reader to Hopkins [6] for an in-depth
analysis of the different approaches taken by states and the chal-
lenges faced during the H1N1 pandemic.
In this article, we present analysis of specific states’ epidemic
curves and the relative effectiveness of vaccine programs. The
essential analytical issue we faced was estimating the epidemic
flu curve in the absence of vaccinewhen the informationwe hadwas
limited and was available only for the presence of vaccine. For
most states, readily available information includes only the per-
centage of all hospitalizations and outpatient visits that were
caused by influenza-like illness (ILI) [7]. The results of our analysis
in this article suggest the importance of administering vaccination
as early as possible, even if the numbers of vaccines administered
are small. Early administration not only serves to decrease the
ort.
Systems Fundamentals (CESF), Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
139, USA.
ciety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
e
b
a
b
d
T
c
t
t
p
t
i
d
b
c
p
t
s
1
i
t
r
s
i
c
o
e
p
v
a
w
t
e
159V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1 5 8 – 1 6 6peak of the epidemic curve but also encourages higher participa-
tion rates from the population.
The problem of vaccine allocation has been analyzed in the
context of distribution of vaccine to various demographic
groups in a population. The public policy consensus has been to
first vaccinate high-risk groups, including pregnant women,
health-care workers, and those at risk of complications from
influenza [8,9]. Some authors, however, claim that in the event
that large stockpiles of vaccine are available, the vaccines
should be distributed to the “drivers” of infection, such as
schoolchildren and other high-activity individuals [10]. Chowell
et al. [11] have approached the problem of measuring vaccine
ffectiveness by modeling a possible outbreak similar to H1N1
ased on Mexican demographics. They concluded that as much
s a 37% reduction in the number of hospitalizations could have
een achieved with an “adaptive” vaccination strategy based on
emographics and information obtained during the outbreak.
he authors suggested that as the outbreak progresses, vac-
ines should be allocated to different age groups in proportion
o the then-reported influenza-like symptoms and hospitaliza-
ions from within those age groups.
While these articles analyze the effectiveness of vaccination
rograms on such parameters as the transmissibility of the flu and
he demographics of the population, we chose to consider another
ssue, the timing of the vaccines administered. The timing of vaccine
istribution has been explored by some authors in the context of
oth general influenza models [12,13] and specific outbreaks
[14,15]. We, in turn, analyzed the effect of vaccine distribution
timing on the spread of the 2009–2010 H1N1 virus in different US
states. The large size of the country allowed us to compare the
spread of the same strain of influenza as it infected different com-
munities at different times.
Specifically, for each of several states, we examined two timing
relationships, the time of onset and growth of the fluwave and the
timing of vaccinations. For each state, we applied simple temporal
models to estimate the number of flu infections averted by the
administration of vaccine.
The rapid and massive spread of H1N1 in Mexico City in the
spring of 2009motivated numerous articles estimating the param-
eters of the epidemic and characterizing the effects of H1N1. The
most important parameter in epidemiology, the reproductive
number R0, is defined as the average number of new infections
aused by a “typical” infectious individual in a fully susceptible
opulation. Early estimates in Mexico estimated R0 to range be-
ween 1.4 and 1.6 [16], implying a potentially dangerous progres-
ion for other countries. This, in turn, led to predicted estimates of
Fig. 1 – Timing of shipment of first vaccine with respect to th.3 to 1.8 for R0 for theUnited States and an estimated 60%nationalnfection rate [17,18]. The CDC later reestimated the range of ac-
ual US infections to be between 43 million and 88 million [19],
epresenting only 14% to 29% of the population.
A study in Ontario, Canada, estimated R0 there to be about 1.31
[20]. The authors attributed the lower-than-predicted estimates to
heightened public awareness and better adherence to hygienic
behavior that reduces virus transmission. In our modeling of US
outbreak progression, we also encountered relatively low values
for R0 but note that these values agreewith findings in Ontario and
the relatively low infection rates reported in the United States.
In a recent article, Sander et al. [15] used an agent-basedmodel
to depict the spread of H1N1 in Ontario. They asserted that the
immunization program in the province was a “cost-effective”
means to prevent H1N1 cases. Ontario’s program started admin-
istering vaccines 2 weeks before the peak of infections in Ontario.
Because most of the states were hit by the outbreak earlier, half of
the states started administering vaccine after the peak had al-
ready passed [21]. Not only were vaccines delivered late, but the
demand for vaccines also declined significantly by the time vac-
cines became available [22]. Eventually, in the United States, as
many as 70 million doses were left unadministered [23]. Surveys
showed that low participation rates were partially a result of con-
cerns for the safety of vaccines and the relative innocuousness of
the H1N1 virus [22,24]. Moreover, by December 2009, when vac-
cines became widely available to everyone, the proportion of peo-
ple in the population who were concerned about the dangers of
H1N1 had dropped significantly from between 51% and 59% to
about 40% [24].
For each state, Figure 1 displays in color codes the timing of
hipment of first vaccine with respect to the peak of the infection
n that state [4]. Six southeastern states received their first vac-
ines more than 4 weeks after the peak of their respective H1N1
utbreaks. The infection then spread northwest, with the north-
astern states having themost time to prepare and vaccinate their
opulations. Maine and isolated Hawaii hadmore than 4 weeks of
accine dispensation prior to the peak outbreak in their states.
This article is a natural follow-up to the Finkelstein et al. [21]
rticle as we demonstrate the potential loss of vaccine effectiveness
ith late shipments.We evaluate the effect of the timing of vaccina-
ion programs in 11 states and suggest some lessons learned in the
vent of future pandemics and immunization efforts.
Methods
To estimate the number of infections averted from the various
ak of the infection in selected states. N/A, not available.e pevaccine programs, we first used available data to estimate the ep-
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160 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1 5 8 – 1 6 6idemic curve during the period in the fall of 2009 when H1N1 was
most prevalent. Once we had obtained an estimated epidemic
curve, we used it in conjunction with reported vaccine adminis-
tration data to fit the observed epidemic curve to the one gener-
ated by a mathematical model based on difference equations. We
used a discrete-time version of the standard Kermack–McKend-
rick model to estimate infection spread within each state [25–27].
n the model calibration process, we estimated the relevant pa-
ameters such as R0 within each state. We estimated the R0 for
each state individually, because different states have different de-
mographic, geographic, and cultural attributes. Moreover, states
experienced the H1N1 outbreak at different times and imple-
mented their vaccination programs in different ways [6], so the
extent of the infection varied markedly.
We then estimated a different, nonobservable flu wave curve,
one assuming no available vaccine. This multistep process pro-
vided a data-informed, model-supported basis for estimating the
positive effects, if any, of the vaccine as administered in each of
the states.
Before describing themethodology in full, it isworthnoting some
common drawbacks to using a discrete-timemodel that implies ho-
mogeneousmixing in the population. Each state’s population is seg-
mented into groups of varying susceptibility, infectivity, and activity
levels, each of which may strongly influence the progression of the
epidemic [28,29]. While all models are imperfect, each region we in-
vestigated was large enough that homogeneous mixing provided a
reasonable estimate for modeling the epidemic curve. This method-
ology was used throughout the H1N1 outbreak [18,30]. In addition,
while epidemics occur in continuous time, our use of a discrete-time
model both simplified calculation and allowed us to incorporate the
fact that during the 2009–2010 H1N1 pandemic, vaccines were
shipped on a weekly basis and vaccine stocks were increased at dis-
crete time intervals.
Epidemic curve estimation
We first estimated the true epidemic curve within the different
states, in which the flu curve includes the effects of vaccinations.
Because this virus was so prevalent in the US population, it was
impossible to record an accurate epidemic curve in each state.
There was no direct way to know the total number of people in-
fected because 1) many such individuals did not present them-
selves to medical authorities and 2) for those who did visit a phy-
sician, confirming tests for H1N1 were not routinely ordered.
Instead, we used the data released by the states’ health depart-
ments that included the weekly percentage of all hospitalizations
and outpatient visits resulting from ILI (%ILI) over the 2009–2010
flu seasons [7]. From that, we estimated the number of H1N1 in-
fections for eachweek.We assumed that the total number of cases
was directly proportional to the total number of H1N1 hospitaliza-
tions and outpatient visits. While the %ILI curve provided a good
indication of the spread of infection, we did not use it as the epi-
demic curve because the total number of hospitalizations and out-
patient visits associated with all medical conditions changes
throughout the year. Each point on the %ILI temporal curve repre-
sents the percentage of the total number of hospitalizations and
outpatient visits that are specific to H1N1. Because the flu wave
first grows and then declines, this total number is not uniform
throughout the observation period. We expect a higher number
of total hospitalizations and outpatient visits during the peak of
H1N1, with the number of non-H1N1 hospitalizations and out-
patient visits remaining relatively stable throughout the sever-
al-month observation period. By using this assumption, we per-
formed a simple transformation on the %ILI curve to obtain a
new curve that we considered to be directly proportional to the
experienced flu wave curve.
To carry out the required transformation, we split our time-
line into discrete “flu generation periods,” with generations rep-resented by t 1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax. In our calculations, we let a single
eneration of the flu be equal to 10/3  2.33 days. Assuming just
ne number for the duration of the flu is a simplification. While
ctual generation of the flu varies with different viruses as well
s on an individual level, we made this simplification to keep
ur discrete-time epidemic curve model tractable. The value we
hose is consistent with the analysis of H1N1 in Mexico done in
ay 2009 [17,20].
We let
(t) the number of nonflu hospital patients in generation t.
Invoking our assumption of a constant number of such pa-
tients over time, we expressed
C(t)C0t 1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax.
Next we considered the unobservable number of flu patients
eeking hospital medical advice: N(t)  the number of patients
with H1N1 who visit a hospital in generation t, for t  1, 2, 3, . . .,
max. What we observed in reported data was F(t), the fraction of all
ospital visits that were attributable to H1N1,
(t)
N(t)
N(t)C0
.
Solving for N(t), we calculated
F(t)[N(t)C0]N(t),
or
F(t)C0N(t)[1 F(t)],
or Nt 
C0Ft
1Ft
.
Invoking the assumption that the total number of H1N1
cases is proportional to the number of H1N1-related hospital
visits, we deduced that the shape of the epidemic curve was
proportional to N(t). Because we had access to F(t) only, the
value of C0, the total number of non-H1N1 hospital visits per
eneration, was unknown. While we did not know that quan-
ity, we could approximate the value of C0 because we knew
he total number of H1N1 visits during our time period. Specif-
cally, we let I be the total number of H1N1 visits in a US state.
hen,

t1
tmax
[N(t)C0]
t1
tmax C0F(t)
1 F(t)
C0 I.
Consequently, we calculated
C0
I
tmaxt1tmax F(t)1 F(t)
.
We approximated I by using information from the CDC regard-
ing the total number of infections in the United States.
This transformation gave us a closer estimate of the actual
epidemic curve than did the %ILI curve by itself. We were still
facedwith the fact, however, that people presented to doctors and
hospitals at different rates throughout the pandemic. One might
conjecture that the rate of hospital visits would have been higher
at the beginning of the pandemic, when media reports were im-
plying a real danger from flulike symptoms, and that the rate
would decrease toward the end of the epidemic, when reports had
confirmed that the consequences of H1N1 were relatively mild;
but the rate of hospital admissions would not be affected by such
psychological factors. Furthermore, there are still other factors,
such as parents of symptomatic children not wishing to present
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161V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1 5 8 – 1 6 6their children to medical facilities for fear of their contracting the
illness, should they not already have it. One can keep conjecturing
ad infinitum. It is difficult to quantify these myriad possible ef-
fects, and so we did not include them in the transformation.
According to the CDC, the percentage of people infected with
H1N1 in the United States ranged from 14% to 29% of the popula-
tion [19]. We tried a range of values for the total number of infec-
tions in the region and fit our model to each one by finding the
parameters that minimized the mean square error between the
epidemic curve and the resulting modeled curve. To find the best
fit, we modified three parameters: the total number of infections,
the number of infections at the start of the epidemic (“patient
zeros”), and R0. For each fit, we took the resulting fitted value of R0.
he values were usually close together, and we chose the value of
0 that best fit the exponential growth of cases near the onset of
he epidemic.
A set of difference equations
We used a set of difference equations that corresponds to a dis-
crete-time version of a classic Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered
(S-I-R) model [25–27,31].
For each state, we adjusted model parameters to obtain a best
fit between the reported data, as transformed above, and themod-
el-generated flu wave epidemic curve. This process led to a direct
estimation of R0.
We let R(t)  the mean number of new infections generated by
randomly selected infectious (asymptomatic) patient at genera-
ion t of the epidemic. t  1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax.
The epidemic curve
Suppose the number of infected people at “generation zero” is 1
person. That is, there is 1 “patient zero.” Then, the mean number
of infected people in generation 1 is R0 persons, each of whom
ubsequently infects on average R(1) persons in generation 2, and
o on. So, in generation t, the mean number of people infected,
I(t), will be the product R0  R(1)  R(2)  . . .  R(t  1). More
ompactly, assuming that MI(0)  1, we calculated
I(t)R0
n1
t1
R(n), t 1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax (2)
where MI(t) is the mean number of infections at time t.
Determining R(t)
Suppose the total population is N persons, all susceptible at the
beginning of the epidemic and all mixing homogeneously—
whether or not they are susceptible or have recovered and have
immunity. Then suppose at generation t we have I(t) people
recovered and immune, recirculating in the population. Be-
cause of homogeneous mixing, R0 is now modified by a factor of
[NI(t)MI(t)]/N, to become
R(t)R0
N I(t)MI(t)
N
, t 1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax. (3)
Determining I(t)
At generation t we assumed that there were a total of I(t) individ-
uals immune to the disease. This immunity can be derived from
having been vaccinated or from having recovered from the dis-
ease. For simplicity in this model, we assumed that individuals
infected in generation (t  1) recovered and were immune in gen-
eration t. We also assumed that during the time of generation
(t  1), V(t  1) individuals received vaccine that made them im-
une for the first time in generation t. Thus, wewrote a difference
quation for determining the value of I(t):(t) I(t 1)MI(t 1)V(t 1), t 1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax. (4)We now had a model consisting of the following three equa-
tions where V(t) is known for all t.
MI(t)R0
n1
t1
R(n), t 1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax
R(t)R0
N I(t)MI(t)
N
, t 1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax
I(t) I(t 1)MI(t 1)V(t 1), t 1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax
These equations can be solved iteratively, via recursion start-
ing with the boundary conditions MI(0), I(0), and R(0)  R0.
Estimating the effects of vaccine
The nonobservable curve
Suppose, in the absence of vaccines,we have a pandemic infection
curve C(t). Here,
C(t)  the number of new flu infections reported during genera-
ion t of the infection period, assumingno vaccine. t 1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax.
We called C(t) the base curve, that is, the infection wave that
occurs in the absence of vaccines. Also, for the sake of simplicity
we assumed that human behavior, as illustrated, for instance, by
hygienic steps and other nonpharmaceutical interventions, re-
mained unchanged during the course of the infection period. This
base curve is unobservable because the state-specific data report-
ing numbers of people infected included the effects of adminis-
tered vaccines.
Timing of vaccinations and subsequent immunity
To depict the effect of vaccinations on the population, we used
V(t), which is the number of individuals who have been vacci-
nated and first acquired immunity during generation t, with t 
, 2, 3, . . ., tmax.
We assumed that only susceptible individuals received vacci-
ations.
On average, vaccines take effect about 2 weeks after they have
een administered. In our approximations, we compared the
umbers calculated in the cases in which the vaccines took effect
mmediately as well as the cases in which vaccines took effect
fter 2 weeks. Similarly, we considered vaccine effectiveness (i.e.,
reating immunity to H1N1) to be between 75% and 100%. Accord-
ng to preliminary studies, the effectiveness of H1N1 vaccine was
ell over 90% in 10 days [32], and so the actual effect of the vac-
ines should be well within the bounds of our analysis.
The observable curve
Another pandemic infection curve,C(t, V), is the number of newflu
infections reported during generation t of the flu, given that im-
munities due to vaccinations occur according to the known time
vector V, with t  1, 2, 3, . . ., tmax.
Our state-derived data depicted the vaccine-affected flu wave
C(t, V), and we wished to infer the (unobservable) vaccine-free flu
wave C(t). To estimate the effect of the vaccinations, we needed to
estimate C(t) and then compare it to C(t, V). The difference in the
areas under the respective curves represented our estimate of the
number of infections averted because of the vaccine.
To estimate R0, we fit the model-generated C(t, V) curve to the
empirically estimated epidemic curve, which includes the effects of
vaccinations. The influenza cases during the H1N1 epidemic were
severely underreported. The underreporting appeared to be espe-
cially significant at the beginning and end of the outbreak [19,33]. To
avoid this “statistical noise” effect, we fit the model-based epidemic
curve to the data surrounding the peak of the epidemic, specifically
to the part of the empirical curve that contains 75% of the cases. To
findabest reasonablefit,weused thedifferenceEquations2, 3, and4,
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termined to be one for which the peak of the model-determined ep-
idemic curve coincided with the estimated real epidemic curve and
for which exponential growth of the early stages of the outbreak
coincidedwith the real epidemic curve. TheR0 obtained byusing this
ethod might be a slight underestimate of the true R0 for the H1N1
andemic because it was not fitted at the very beginning of the out-
reak when data were very noisy, but only once clear exponential
rowthwas established. Thismethodology, however, is consistently
sed in the literature and provides a reasonable estimate for the
asic reproductive number [16,34].
Results
Oklahoma in detail
Consider as an illustrative example the estimation process for Okla-
homa. Figure 2 shows 1) the empirical-based estimated epidemic
curve for Oklahoma created using the transformation described
above and 2) the time-sequenced vaccine administration data re-
ported by the state. In Figure 3, we again included the empirical epi-
demic curve and three model-generated epidemic curves:
1. The curve generated by using the Oklahoma-reported vaccine
administration data, fitted to correspond best to the empirical
epidemic curve;
Fig. 2 – The estimated Oklahoma epidemic curve compared
with vaccines as they were administered in the state. OK,
Oklahoma.
Fig. 3 – The estimated epidemic curve along with the
model-generated curves with and without vaccines. The
best fit for Oklahoma was found with parameters R = 1.14,0
I(0) = 1500, and I(0) = 0. OK, Oklahoma.2. The curve generated in the hypothetical case in which vaccines
were not administered at all; and
3. The curve generated in the hypothetical case in which vaccines
were administered 2 weeks earlier than had actually occurred.
The total number of infections caused by the outbreak in Okla-
homa was calculated by the area under an epidemic curve. The
effect of the vaccines administered in Oklahoma was determined
by calculating the area between the “actual” model-generated
curve and the “no-vaccine” model-generated curve (Fig. 4).
We analyzed 11 states in detail and inferred the total number of
infections that were prevented as a result of their respective im-
munization programs. The states Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, and Virginia graciously provided us with
precise data on vaccines as they were dispensed throughout the
outbreak. Here we display two cases for each state:
1. The optimistic case, in which all vaccines are effective imme-
diately and are 100% effective, and
2. The pessimistic case, in which vaccines are effective 2 weeks
after administration and are effective for only 75% of the indi-
viduals receiving the vaccine.
The actual effect of the vaccine should lie within the range
specified by these two cases.
It is possible that some ILI-related cases were reported with a
delay of 1 or 2 weeks with respect to symptom onset, because in-
fected individuals may bemore likely to visit a medical professional
after symptoms become severe. If that is the case, our estimated
epidemic curve might be shifted to the left by a few generations. If
true, the infectionsoccurredevenearlier thanwhatwehadassumed,
and so vaccine arrival occurred even laterwith respect to the peak of
infections. This would imply that our results are an optimistic esti-
Fig. 4 – A closer look at Figure 3. The shaded region
represents the difference between the estimated number of
H1N1 infections that would have occurred without the
intervention of vaccines and the estimated number of
infections that actually occurred with the vaccine.mate of the effectiveness of states’ vaccine programs.
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In Table 1wepresent the results of analysis of 11 stateswith detailed
vaccination information.While we have detailed data for only these
11 states, we note that the range of estimated values for R0 is fairly
arrow, with higher values falling onmore populated states such as
ewYork and Illinois and lower values corresponding to states with
ower population density such as Oklahoma and Montana. Geo-
raphic proximity also seems to result in similar R0 values.
More detailed information for all states is included inAppendix
A in Supplemental Materials at doi:10.1016/j.jval.2011.07.014.
Discussion
While examining the estimated numbers of infections averted, we
can identify two major contributing factors. The first is the total
number of vaccines administered to the general population. The
second is the timing of the vaccine administration with respect to
the peak of the infections. Once theH1N1 virus had been identified
as a potentially devastating pandemic in the spring of 2009, the
CDC worked to develop and distribute H1N1 vaccines. These vac-
cines were sent out to the individual states at the same time, and
first doses were administered on October 5, 2009. These vaccines,
however, had varying effects because the peak of the outbreak in
different states occurred at markedly different times.
The peak of infection usually occurs when herd immunity oc-
curs, that is, the timewhen R(t) 1, and every infectious person at
that time infects on average just one other person [35]. So, at the
time of herd immunity, the number of infections in the next gen-
eration is approximately the same as it was in the previous one.
We say “approximately” because of statistical fluctuations in the
actual number of susceptible people that any one newly infectious
person will infect. Soon afterward, infectious people no longer
replace themselves in society, and the number of infected and
infectious people in each generation decreases. Early administra-
tion of vaccines decreases the number of people who still need to
be infected before herd immunity is achieved, and so decreases
the height of the peak. Late administration of the vaccine has
almost no effect on the dynamics of the outbreak and has little
benefit to the society other than immunizing the people who re-
ceived the vaccine. Such late immunizations may be important if
the flu were to return later in a new wave.
Consider again the southeastern states of the United States,
the first region to report infection peaks. As early victims they
received vaccines after the worst of the infection had already
Table 1 – Summary of best-fitted values for R0 and model-d
State Estimated
R0
% Population
vaccinated in
Illinois 1.21 9
Indiana 1.15 20
Massachusetts 1.16 29
Mississippi 1.16 8
Montana 1.15 20
New Jersey 1.20 12
New York 1.20 14
North Dakota 1.16 27
Oklahoma 1.14 13
South Carolina 1.16 8
Virginia 1.19 22
*In the optimistic scenario, vaccines are 100% effective and take effec
take effect 2 wk after being administered.passed. Louisiana, Indiana, and South Carolina had not startedadministering vaccines until after the peak of outbreak. And these
tates were least successful in averting infections. On the other
and,Massachusetts andVirginia started administering their vac-
ines 5 and 3 weeks, respectively, before their respective peaks.
hese two states enjoyed a particularly good impact from their vac-
ination programs. Massachusetts, in addition to having 5 weeks of
accinations prior to the H1N1 peak, vaccinated 29% of its popula-
ion, themost of any state in our sample. As a result, as much as 7%
o 14% of the populationmay have been spared infection and possi-
le complications from influenza.WhileMassachusetts and Virginia
ad effective experiences with their vaccinations, most states did
ot. On average for our limited sample, vaccines were delivered just
efore the peak of the states’ outbreaks.
To quantify the effect of time in averting infectionwe considered
ne of the states that vaccinated almost 20% of its population, Indi-
na. Hypothetically, if the same number of vaccines had been deliv-
red just 2 weeks earlier, more than twice the number of infections
ould have been averted.
With a more granular approach, we considered the marginal
enefit of administering just one vaccination at a given time. We
apped the total projected number of infections that could be
verted if just one vaccination were to be administered to a sus-
eptible person at different times during the outbreak. That is, we
alculated the total number of infections that would occur in In-
iana if exactly one vaccine were administered at different points
n time and compared that number to the total number of infec-
ions that would happen if no vaccines were administered at all.
he differences are presented in Figure 5. As expected, adminis-
mined effects of vaccines as they were distributed*.
imistic scenario:
ons averted (in % of
tal population)
Pessimistic scenario:
infections averted (in % of
total population)
3.43 1.2
4.28 1.81
13.71 6.84
0.13 0.05
2.81 1.04
3.36 1.1
3.23 1.12
2.95 1.06
2.29 0.93
0.4 0.12
1.77 0.52
ediately. In the pessimistic scenario, vaccines are 75% effective and
Fig. 5 – The plot shows the number of infections averted by
administering exactly one vaccination at different pointseter
Opt
fecti
to
t immthroughout the outbreak. IN, Indiana.
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spect to time. A striking feature of Figure 5 is the fact that one
vaccination to a susceptible person well before the flu wave starts
averts almost two infections in the population, even with a low
value for R0 (1.15) and even considering the fact that the vacci-
nated person has a greater than even chance of never becoming
infected assuming no vaccination. Clearly, vaccines administered
well before the peak carry the added benefit of diluting the sus-
ceptible population with immune people and are particularly use-
ful in mitigating the spread of infection.
Another insightful feature of this graph is the slope of themar-
ginal benefit curve, which represents the time dependence of ef-
fective vaccines. While starting vaccine administration in Indiana
in July would be most effective for Indiana, the effect of these
vaccines would not change significantly until the beginning of
September. That is, if vaccines were to be available in July, Indiana
could have waited to receive its share until September with min-
imal losses. Similarly, vaccines received after December will have
the same (minimal) effect whether they are administered in De-
cember or February. The effectiveness of vaccines, however, is
extremely time sensitive from the end of September to mid-No-
vember, where each week results in a significant loss of effective-
ness. Vaccines that become available during this critical period
Fig. 6 – The relationship between the timing of vaccine
delivery with respect to the peak and the percentage of the
state population that received the H1N1 vaccine for all 50
states. w.r.t., with respect to.
Fig. 7 – During the early stages of the outbreak when the de
Disease Control and Prevention distributed vaccine proportionalneed to be administered as soon as possible. These results encour-
age us to recommend a more detailed cost–benefit analysis of
trying to get some vaccine, even if in much smaller quantities, to
the states at the beginning of this “critical period,” when the pop-
ulation is particularly sensitive to the timing of vaccination. A
small amount of vaccine delivered early should have a more sig-
nificant effect on the total number of infections than a batch de-
livered just a few weeks later.
Furthermore, we conjecture that the timeliness of the vaccines
is also closely related to the total amount of vaccine accepted by
the population.While the CDC distributed its vaccines proportion-
ally to the population of each region, states varied in the amount of
vaccine that was actually used. For instance, Mississippi used less
than 40% of its allocated vaccine, most likely due to “flu fatigue.”
While the media are particularly helpful at warning the public of
an ongoing pandemic and encouraging the use of nonpharmaceu-
tical interventions, they can also give the impression that the out-
break is over or has been blown out of proportion. Once the peak of
the outbreak had passed andH1N1 had been determined to be less
dangerous thanwas originally feared, the populations of the “early
victim” states would be less likely to spend their time and risk
perceived possible side effects of getting a flu shot.
Looking at all 50 states and comparing the percentage of vac-
cinated population by the end of the outbreak to the week of vac-
cine delivery [36], we notice in Figure 6 aweak negative correlation
between the timing of vaccine delivery with respect to the peak,
and the total percentage of the population that accepted vaccina-
tions. These results are consistent with the position of Harris et al.
[22] that had the vaccines been delivered earlier to the states,more
people would have been encouraged to accept a vaccination.
This effect would be particularly relevant to South Carolina,
which started administering its vaccines 1 week after the peak of
infection and subsequently managed to vaccinate only 8% of its
population. If these vaccinations were to have started earlier, be-
fore the peak, we could hypothesize not only an increase in effec-
tiveness from timing alone but also a higher participation rate in
the vaccination program. Early administration is particularly im-
portant in that it increases the efficacy of vaccine along with en-
couraging people to accept vaccination.
Vaccine allocation
As shown in Figure 7, in the first fewweeks of vaccine distribution,
when demand for vaccine clearly exceeded supply, the CDC allo-
cated vaccine to states proportionally to their populations [4]. Par-
d for vaccines outweighed the supply, the Centers forman
ly to the population of the states.
e165V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1 5 8 – 1 6 6ticularly in early October, this simple distribution scheme ensured
that all states received amounts that could be used to immunize
the same proportion of the population. Come November, those
states that saw little demand started placing fewer orders for in-
fluenza vaccine, while those with later epidemics such as Massa-
chusetts and Virginia were still experiencing high demand and
were shipped larger quantities of vaccine, confirming the intuition
from Figure 6.
The previous sections imply that the same vaccines adminis-
tered in states that had already experienced the peak of the infec-
tion at the time vaccines started arriving were much less effective
than those administered in states that hadnot yet experienced the
peak. Moreover, the states that were past the peak saw less de-
mand for vaccines and thus used only a small fraction of their
allocated vaccines. Consider a side-by-side analysis of Mississippi
and North Dakota in Table 2.
It is clear that vaccines administered in North Dakota were
significantly more effective than those in Mississippi. In fact, the
Mississippi vaccines had almost no effect because the infection
was barely spreading by the time vaccines became available. Cou-
pled with this, North Dakota was experiencing more demand for
the vaccines at the beginning of its program. Based on this analy-
sis, we believe that there is a need for more effective procedures
for allocating vaccines to US states.
Naturally, allocating all of Mississippi’s vaccines to North
Dakota would be not only unethical but also politically infeasi-
ble. Instead, as a thought experiment, suppose that just 20% of
Mississippi’s unused vaccine were to be transferred to North
Dakota during the first 4 weeks of vaccine distribution. Suppose
that with this addition, 60% of the new vaccines were actually
administered. This additional vaccine would decrease the total
number of infections in North Dakota by 5%. That is a significant
improvement for a relatively small cost. An adaptive decision
such as this can be made during the allocation process. We can
form even approximate predictions about how much vaccine
will actually be demanded by the state and how effective the
extra vaccines would be in reducing infections. For example, by
using data collected from our 11 states, we can weakly estimate
that a state that had experienced peak infection 6 weeks earlier
can be expected to vaccinate no more than 4% of its population
within the first 4 weeks. In the first 4 weeks of the 2009 H1N1
outbreak, the CDC allocated to Mississippi enough vaccine to
cover 7% of its population. With accurate data, some portion of
that could have been redirected to states that were more likely
to use and benefit from the vaccine.
Conclusions
Our analysis shows the importance of the timing of vaccinations
for infectious respiratory diseases such as influenza. We empha-
size the need to start administering vaccines well before the peak
of an influenza outbreak. Moreover, when a governing body such
as the CDC is faced with the allocation decision, it is important to
take into consideration the stages of the outbreaks in different
Table 2 – Comparison of vaccination programs in North Da
North Dakota
● Started administration 1 wk before peak
● A hypothetical single batch of 32,342 vaccines (5% of the populatio
administered on October 10 averts 33,745 infections (5.2% of the
population)
● In the first 4 wk administered 62% of available vaccinesregions and to deploy vaccine with preference to the regions thatare projected to administer more of the vaccine with greater ben-
eficial effects.
In our analysis of individual state immunization programs
we used a relatively simple model, assuming a homogeneous
population and a deterministic model structure. As a result, our
model, as most models, is not an exact picture of what hap-
pened during the fall of 2009, but rather a tool to gain insight
about strategies that could help the public mitigate the effect of
influenza pandemics. While the exact numbers almost surely
differ from the estimates, the relative results should hold under
a range of assumptions about R0 vaccine efficacy and the gen-
ration period of the flu.
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